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Abstract 
This paper finds significant evidence that commodity log price changes can predict industry-
level returns for horizons of up to six trading weeks (30 days). We find that for the 1985-2010 
period, 40 out of 49 U.S. industries can be predicted by at least one commodity. Our findings are 
consistent with Hong and Stein’s (1999) “underreaction hypothesis.” Unlike prior literature, we 
pinpoint the length of underreaction by employing daily data. We provide a comprehensive 
examination of the return linkages among 25 commodities and 49 industries. This provides a 
more detailed investigation of underreaction and investor inattention hypotheses than most 
related literature. Finally, we implement data-mining robust methods to assess the statistical 
significance of industry returns reactions to commodity log price changes, with precious metals 
(such as gold) featuring most prominently. While our results indicate modest out-of-sample 
forecast ability, they confirm evidence that commodity data can predict equity returns more than 
four trading weeks ahead. 
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1. Introduction 
The “underreaction” of participants in one financial market to information originating in 
other segments of the financial ecosystem has been studied with theoretical and empirical 
frameworks.1 Hong and Stein (1999) define underreaction as a delayed reaction by equity market 
participants to commodity returns (log price changes).2 We examine the links between 
commodity and equity markets in this context. Prior literature (such as Driesprong et al., 2008, 
and Fan and Jahan-Parvar, 2012) generally centers on monthly energy (oil) data. We are 
primarily interested in how long it takes for equity markets to fully incorporate information from 
fluctuations in commodities.  
Our approach has certain benefits compared with previous work. First, by modeling at daily 
frequency, we can pinpoint the length of underreaction in U.S. industry-level equity returns to 
information originating in commodity markets while minimizing effects of conflating dynamics 
at business cycle frequencies. Second, we do not limit emphasis to a single industry but 
undertake a comprehensive examination by considering a large swath of commodities and 
industries. Finally, we are one of the first papers to study gradual information diffusion among 
commodities and industries. We do so using an approach that explicitly accounts for data-
mining, which builds upon the key work of Rapach and Wohar (2006) and Herrera et al. (2011). 
To our knowledge, ours is the first study that documents Hong and Stein’s (1999) underreaction 
hypothesis within the commodity markets.  
The key findings of our paper are the following: First, it often takes a several weeks before 
commodity price information is fully incorporated into industry returns (i.e. there is an 
                                                          
1 See Hong and Stein (1999) and Hong, Torous, and Valkanov, (2007) for examples of theoretical and empirical 
investigations, respectively. 
2 We use “(log) commodity price changes” and “commodity returns” interchangeably. 
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underreaction), second, commodities seemingly unrelated to a sector have strong predictive 
ability for the returns of that particular sector, third there are strong predictive links between 
most commodities, considered.  These findings have implications for asset allocation decisions 
and for market makers. For asset allocation they could assist in the timing of asset purchases or 
sales and suggests that information that is more two weeks old should be considered. For market 
makers they potentially provide information which would help them if a fall was predicted to set 
lower ask prices (or slightly wider spreads) to manage potential losses should a price drop occur. 
In addition, these results more broadly are inconsistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis and 
implicitly mean that prices are not even Markovian let alone based on rational expections.  
A closer look into our results indicates that we find the length of delayed reaction of US 
industry-level equity returns to information originating in commodity is frequently longer than 
20 trading days. We determine that some non-energy commodities can predict industry equity 
returns. For example, since 1985 precious metals provide more evidence of equity market 
predictability than energy. We provide evidence using both “underreaction” methods and 
Granger causality tests and find that market participants react to new information with a non-
negligible lag.3 Our results indicate that information spills over slowly i) within commodity 
sectors and ii) from precious metals to other commodities. This gradual diffusion of information 
from commodity to equity markets may be surprising to proponents of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis. However, this seemingly surprising observation lends support to Hong and Stein’s 
(1999) theoretical analysis.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we provide the background to the 
study. Section 3 introduces and discusses the data, while the econometric models used in this 
                                                          
3 Studies that investigate the incorporation of macroeconomic data into equity prices such as Schwert (1981) and 
Pearce and Roley (1985) imply that these data are impounded into asset prices within one trading week (five trading 
days). 
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study are outlined in Section 4. We present new empirical findings in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Background 
The efficient market hypothesis implies that all relevant information is immediately 
incorporated into asset prices. Implicitly, this assertion means that market participants can 
identify relevant information and process it accurately. A growing body of literature questions 
this notion. Investors may focus on specific sources of information and may also be subject to 
behavioral biases in information processing and decision making (see, for example, Barberis and 
Thaler, 2003, and Hirshleifer, 2008 for a review of this literature).  Few traders pay attention to 
all potential sources of information. Many traders specialize in very limited asset classes, certain 
geographic regions, certain sectors, or even trading styles. At best, they are only boundedly 
rational (see Shiller, 2000, and Sims, 2003). The rise of high-frequency and algorithmic trading, 
so far, has not fundamentally altered this fact (see Chaboud et al., 2013). Thus, time and 
information processing constraints may open an important avenue through which delayed 
reactions to commodity returns could systematically appear. Our results in this paper are 
consistent with this conclusion. 
Hong and Stein (1999) and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) develop theoretical models to 
explain asset price behavior under conditions of limited information.4 Importantly, these 
theoretical models demonstrate that if there are information frictions, then asset returns can 
respond with a delay. Hong and Stein (1999) develop a dynamic model of a single asset in which 
                                                          
4 Merton (1987) also develops a static model in which investors have information about a limited number of stocks 
and only trade those that they have information about. As a result, less recognized stocks have a smaller investor 
base (neglected stocks) and trade at a greater discount because of limited risk-sharing.   
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information gradually diffuses across the investing public and investors are unable to extract 
information from prices. In this model, the price reacts gradually to new information 
(underreacts) and over time information becomes fully incorporated into stock price, leading to 
return predictability. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) suggest an alternative model where investors 
may not fully react to information due to limited attention and processing power. In particular, 
data from which it is more difficult to extract the appropriate price response is more likely to be 
neglected. Consequently, indirect information about an asset is less likely to be quickly 
incorporated into prices than direct information. 
Driesprong, et al. (2008), Kilian and Park (2009), Gogineni (2010) and Fan and Jahan-Parvar 
(2012) examine oil prices and their impact on index and industry level returns.5 Huang et al. 
(1996) conjecture that information originating from a commodity market, in their case the oil 
futures market, may either influence the future cash flows of a company or an industry, or it may 
affect the discount rate.6  
It is possible that commodity prices could have both a direct and an indirect impact upon 
industry stock returns. A direct impact could, for example, result if an industry uses the 
commodity as an input or produces the commodity as an output. Some commodities will only 
have an indirect link to industry returns. It is harder to rule out the indirect impact of any 
commodity's price movements on industry returns.  First, commodity prices could be correlated 
with business cycle conditions and thus contain information that could impact expected future 
returns (see e.g. Fama and French, 1988). Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) find commodity 
                                                          
5 Kilian and Park (2009) suggest that the response depends on whether the origin is from supply or demand shocks. 
They argue that the major channel is shocks to aggregate demand, rather than through aggregate supply. Lee and Ni 
(2002) also investigate this issue. They find that the major effects of oil price shocks are on the demand side, unless 
the industry is highly oil-intensive (such as industrial chemicals) where supply side dominates. 
6 Huang et al. (1996) use daily data, as we do in this paper, but their study is focused on the impact of price changes 
in crude oil futures contracts, and they do not address the underreaction question. In contrast, we are concerned with 
spot prices for commodities and their information content. 
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index returns depend on phase of expansion / recession. Jacobsen, Marshall and Visaltanachoti 
(2010) find that the correlation between industrial metals and equity returns depends on the state 
of the economy. In recessions (expansions) industrial metals have a positive (negative) 
correlation with the business cycle. Second, a particular commodity could be correlated with 
other commodities that are inputs to an industry and hence could contain information about 
expected cash flows. Harri, Nalley and Hudson (2009) provide some evidence that corn prices 
and oil prices are interconnected. They conjecture that such connections could arise from corn 
production having become more energy-intensive as well as agricultural commodities being used 
to generate energy. Finally, we note that commodity prices could be a leading indicator of global 
economic activity. For example, Hamilton (1983) reports substantial oil price rises precede US 
recessions. Kilian (2009) reports that a substantial component of oil price shocks are linked to 
global aggregate demand.   
Chng (2009) indicates there could be other connections between commodities and industry 
returns. He studies trading dynamics of futures contracts written on seemingly unrelated 
commodities but primarily used by a common industry; he finds information contained in one of 
these commodities is useful for predicting the other commodity futures (which are inputs to the 
same industry). 
Extensive literature examines the speed with which asset prices respond to new information. 
Anderson et al. (2007) find that asset prices respond quickly to new information in their study of 
equity, bond and foreign exchange markets. Further support for a rapid incorporation of 
information—within a day is—provided by Busse and Green (2002). Nevertheless there is some 
evidence that markets respond with a substantial delay to some firm-specific information. Two 
prominent examples of this are post-earnings announcement drift (Ball and Brown, 1968) and 
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price momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Hence, while many studies find rapid equity 
price responses to announcements, there are some important exceptions even when direct 
information is considered.  
Another issue examined is how quickly new information is embedded into commodities. 
There is some evidence that commodity prices respond very quickly to their own production 
information (Milonas, 1987; Colling and Irwin, 1990). However, for oil there is some interesting 
evidence that questions how responsive oil prices are to potentially important announcements. 
Brunetti et al. (2011) report that oil prices do not respond to OPEC (production) announcements, 
while Kilian and Vega (2011) report oil prices do not respond to U.S. macroeconomic 
announcements. Nonetheless, it is possible that oil is a leading indicator of macroeconomic 
conditions, hence announcement information is already incorporated into the oil price.  In 
contrast, there is evidence that agricultural commodities respond quickly to direct relevant 
information. For example, Milonas (1987) finds agricultural prices respond to USDA crop 
announcements. Colling and Irwin (1990) provide evidence for the livestock market, confirming 
that prices generally adjust to unanticipated changes on the day following the release of USDA 
information.7 Hence, the findings for oil might not necessarily hold for non-energy commodities.  
 
3. Data 
The data sample is January 1985 to December 2014 at a daily frequency. This covers our 
initial in-sample period from January 1985 to July 2010, which is subsequently extended through 
                                                          
7 Colling and Irwin (1990) also find livestock prices do not react to anticipated changes in reported information.   
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to December 2014 to provide for an out-of-sample forecasting period.8 The full sample period 
covers the early 1990s global recession, the more recent financial crisis, as well as periods of 
economic growth. 
Industry level return data is taken from Kenneth R. French's data bank. We consider 47 
industry level portfolios measured at daily frequencies. These portfolios are annually rebalanced 
at the end of June, and their industry classifications are based on four-digit SIC codes.9 The 
portfolio returns used are value-weighted across firms in the relevant industry. Commodity data 
is based upon daily spot price data taken from Thomson’s Datastream.10 The log of the change in 
commodity price is used to calculate the commodity return. A broad cross-section of 25 different 
commodities are investigated covering diverse sectors from energy to grains, from precious 
metals to softs and from industrial metals to livestock. 
 
4. Econometric Methodology  
In this section, we describe our econometric approach for detection of predictability in 
commodity markets and from commodity markets to equity market at the industry level.  
4.1. Granger Causality Investigation 
We use the well-known linear Granger causality approach (Granger, 1969, and Sims, 1972). 
The estimated statistical model is vector autoregression (VAR) of the form: 
                                                          
8 Goyal and Welch (2008) contend that many positive predictability results in the literature depend on the sample 
period containing the 1974 oil price shock. Our data is not subject to Goyal and Welch’s contention because our 
empirical analysis begins in 1985. 
9 A descriptive table is available upon request. Further information on the industry level return dataset is available 
from Kenneth French’s website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
10 For more detailed description of the commodity data employed, see Vivian and Wohar (2012), especially 
Appendix A, who use a shorter sample of the same commodity data in their study. 
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Where rit and rct are changes in industry i and commodity c returns. Innovations follow the 
usual VAR assumptions. Within the context of this VAR model, linear Granger causality 
restrictions are defined in the case when the null hypothesis that all ji,φ are jointly equal zero is 
rejected. This would be the case when industry returns Granger-cause commodity log price 
changes. Similarly, if the null hypothesis that all ,i jα  are jointly equal to zero is rejected, it is 
argued that lagged commodity prices Granger-cause industry returns. Different test statistics 
have been proposed to test for linear Granger causality restrictions. This study, similar to Huang 
et al. (1996), relies on the conventional χ2-test for joint exclusion restrictions. The Newey-West 
method is used to generate a robust covariance matrix. 
4.2.  Predictive Regressions 
We test the underreaction hypothesis by using a variant of the predictive models used in 
Hong et al. (2007), Driesprong et al. (2008), and Fan and Jahan-Parvar (2012), among others. 
The predictive model is represented as 
 it
c
jtjiji
i
t rr εαµ ++= −,,  (4.2) 
where rti is industry i’s returns, µi,j and αi,j are real-valued parameters, rct-j represent jth-lagged 
percentage change in commodity c’s spot prices, and εti is the error term. In contrast to most 
closely related literature, we estimate this model using higher frequency daily data. This 
predictive regression includes only one independent variable in the right hand side. The logic for 
this choice is to measure the longest lag that independently records any evidence of 
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predictability, since we are interested in measuring the first instance of information reaching an 
industry from a particular commodity market.  
4.3. Robust Critical Values 
An important issue with predictive regressions is that, where the same data set is used 
repeatedly for inference, there is a reasonable concern about data mining. Rapach and Wohar 
(2006) and Herrera et al. (2011) propose remedies for this concern, which we modify for our 
framework and research questions.11 Consequently, the approach we implement for testing 
underreaction is not based on conventional critical values for the t-statistic. Instead, we compute 
empirical critical values via a bootstrap procedure in the spirit of Rapach and Wohar (2006). In 
this section, we explain the procedure to derive these critical values.  
For each industry-commodity combination (49 industries × 25 commodities), we fit equation 
4.2 recursively to 1,000 non-parametric bootstrapped samples under the null of no predictability. 
For each bootstrapped sample, we save the t-statistics with the largest absolute value amongst 
the 30 lags (trading days), for each industry-commodity pair. Then we form the distribution of 
maximal absolute t-statistics for each commodity-industry pair combination from the 1,000 
bootstrap samples and take the maximal critical value for that commodity-industry pair. In the 
spirit of Herrera et al. (2011) we then pool these critical values across all the regression 
combinations considered, which are in total 1,225 industry-commodity pairs. Specifically, we 
pool all the maximal critical values (from absolute t-statistics) across commodity-industry pairs 
and then we take the 10th percentile of all these critical values as the data-mining robust t-
statistic. These empirical critical values are much larger in absolute value than conventional 
                                                          
11 We thank Lutz Kilian for pointing us in this direction, and Ana Maria Herrera and Walt Enders for detailed 
discussions leading to this solution. A detailed appendix on the bootstrap procedure can be made available upon 
request. 
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critical values and, thus, subject our results to substantially more stringent criteria for statistical 
significance.  
Because of our choice of recording the maximal absolute values of test statistics, these values 
are bounded away from conventional Student-t values; this translates into substantially larger 
absolute critical values of 3.5136 at the 10% confidence level for the full sample. We pursue 
such stringent process to mitigate any data-mining concerns that may arise from our 
comprehensive investigation of industry-commodity pairs. Note that we repeat the procedure 
described above for each in-sample period. In turn, these high critical values will translate into 
substantially fewer rejections of the null hypothesis of no predictability in estimated results for 
equation 4.2. Thus, in empirical results, we report at most 147 t-statistics from 36,750 estimated 
t-statistics, less than 0.5% of the total.12  
 
4.4. Out-of-sample forecasts  
We now outline the out-of-sample tests used in this paper. The basis of these regression 
results is a fixed length, sliding window regression with window size equal to 1,220 
observations, or roughly five trading years.13 The out-of-sample results are based on augmenting 
our initial data set with observations going through to December 31, 2014, period. This adds 
more than four years of additional trading observations.  
                                                          
12 36,750 estimated t-statistics using the actual data sample are computed since for each of the 49 industries and each 
of the 25 commodities, we estimate equation (4.2) with 30 commodity lags. Thus, 49 × 25 × 30 gives the total 
number of computed t-statistics. 
13 Our results are robust to the choice of sliding window size. Based on our experimentation, reducing the window 
size to just 500 observations renders negligible impact on estimated values. 
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We denote the in-sample portion of our data as N and our out-of-sample portion as M. Thus, 
for a sample size equal to T, we have T = N + M. We denote the number of steps ahead in our 
regressions by m. The forecast model is  
, ,
1
.µ α ε+ − +
=
= + +∑
S
i c i
t m i j i j t j t m
j
r r         (4.3) 
In this exercise, N corresponds to the observation number on 12/31/2010 and S corresponds 
to the maximal lag length found to be significant. We fit the data to equation (4.3), starting on 
August 1, 2010, rolling the estimating regression forward one day at a time and saving the 
estimation results. We then form forecasts of realized industry level returns by computing:  
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1
ˆˆ ,
S
i c
t m i j i j t j
j
f rµ α+ + −
=
= + ∑         (4.4) 
where m denotes the number of steps ahead, and estimated intercept and slope parameters - µˆ
and αˆ  - are based on fitting equation (4.3) to the in-window returns through running an OLS 
regression of m-step ahead industry returns on commodity log price changes. The alternative 
model is simply the historical mean, as in Goyal and Welch (2008), where: 
i
mti
i
mtr ++ += εµ           (4.5) 
Thus, returns forecast is simply:  
i
i
mtf µ
~ˆ~
=+ .           (4.6) 
We then compute the forecast errors i mt
i
mtmt fre +++ −=,1   and i mti mtmt fre +++ −=
~
,2  , respectively. 
Based on these two forecast error measures, we carry out forecast performance measures. 
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Our main concern is whether the evidence of in-sample predictability translates into out-of-
sample forecast ability. As Inoue and Kilian (2005) point out, while in-sample predictability is a 
necessary condition for out-of-sample forecast ability, it is not sufficient. Hence, we carry out a 
standard battery of forecast comparison tests to measure the ability of commodity log price 
changes in forecasting industry returns. To that end, we use two measures of forecast adequacy: 
The Clark and West (2007) test of predictive adequacy and an adjusted Theil (1971) “U 
measure.”  
The Clark and West (2007) test statistic is specifically designed to address forecast accuracy 
for nested linear models, such as ours. The Clark and West (2007) test explicitly adjusts for the 
fact that the unrestricted model in finite samples will be subject to larger parameter estimation 
errors. Their test statistic, which they call the MSPE-adjusted statistic, is constructed by defining: 
2 2 2( ) [( ) ( ) ]i i i i i i it m t m t m t m t m t m t mg r f r f f f+ + + + + + += − − − − −  .     (4.7) 
Then by regressing gt+m onto a constant and then computing the t-statistics corresponding to 
that constant, we can calculate a p-value for a one-sided test (upper tail) under standard Normal 
distribution law.  
We also report Theil’s (1971) adjusted U measure, where the unrestricted model forecast is 
adjusted for parameter estimation error as suggested by Clark and West (2007).14 This is 
calculated as:   
  
2 2 2
2
{[( ) [( ) ( ) ]}
_
( )
T m
i i i i i
t m t m t m t m t m t m
i N
T m
i i
t m t m
N
r f r f f f
Adj U
r f
−
+ + + + + +
−
+ +
− − − − −
=
−
∑
∑
 

   (4.8) 
                                                          
14 An adjusted out of sample R2 is simply computed as:  OOS R2 = 1 – Adj_U 2 
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5. Empirical Findings 
5.1. Granger Causality Test Results 
We find that almost every industry return is Granger-caused by multiple commodity 
returns.15 The lag lengths range from one to 30 days. However, the vast majority of these are in 
excess of five trading days and it is common to find lag lengths in excess of 20 trading days (four 
trading weeks).  
We find the return of chemical firms is Granger caused by twenty of the twenty-five 
commodity returns at the 10% significance level. Interestingly, the three commodities with the 
shortest lead time for chemical industry returns are in the energy sector. This seems consistent 
with the investor inattention hypothesis. Given that chemical industry is highly energy intensive, 
investors should be aware of the importance of energy prices and react more quickly to these 
than other commodities with more opaque links.16 
Figure 1 shows the lag length in the Granger causality tests for each of the 47 industries 
where any predictability was found from four commodities, propane, oats, nickel and gold base. 
These four commodities were chosen since they had the most evidence of predictability in their 
commodity sector (energy, grains, industrial metals and precious metals). Each of these 
commodities demonstrate predictability for a large majority of the equity industry returns. 
However, it is interesting and perhaps surprising that for most cases, significant lag lengths 
                                                          
15 Only 47 (out of 49) industries was the null hypothesis of no Granger causality rejected at 10% confidence level or 
smaller by at least one commodity. Only two industries, agriculture and food, out of forty-nine industries are not 
Granger-caused by any commodity. It may seem surprising that there is no predictive power for agriculture or food 
from the grain commodities. However, this result is in line with Fan and Jahan-Parvar (2012) who find oil only has 
predictive ability for industries where there is no direct connection, which is consistent with investor inattention 
theory (Hirschleifer and Teoh, 2003). A full table of these results is available upon request. 
16 The chemical sector more broadly accounts for about 25% of energy consumption of all U.S. manufacturers: 
http://www.eia.gov/emeu/mecs/iab98/chemicals/energy_use.html  
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exceed 20 trading days, especially for propane and gold base. This highlights again the extent of 
the delayed reaction of industry returns to commodity returns.    
A gradual reaction of industry returns over several trading weeks is consistent with results of 
prior studies for oil (one key commodity) that documented underreaction using monthly data 
(Driesprong et al., 2008; Fan and Jahan-Parvar, 2012). Our new evidence indicates that this 
delayed reaction of stock returns is not confined just to oil or energy commodities but is widely 
apparent across a range of different commodities including precious metals and grains. 
One possible reason why industry returns are predicted by so many different commodities is 
that commodities themselves may be inter-related. That is, commodities may predict the return 
of other commodities. As a robustness check, we estimated equation (4.1) replacing industry 
return in rti, with another commodity return.17 We reject the null of no Granger causality for the 
majority of commodity pairs. This suggests that even within the commodity market, past 
commodity data potentially contains important information about the future returns of other 
commodities.18  
5.2. Underreaction 
We fit equation 4.2 to our sampled data.19 Our goal is to provide evidence on the speed at 
which commodity information is incorporated into stock market returns. By using daily data, we 
are able to provide estimates of the number of days before current commodity information has no 
                                                          
17 Results are available upon request. 
18 This mechanism is suggestive of an indirect effect. Suppose that commodity A Granger causes commodity B. 
Further suppose that commodity A has no clear relation to an industry, while commodity B has first or second order 
connections with the industry in question. Then, commodity A, through its predictive power for commodity B, can 
also predict the industry’s costs and, by extension, its returns. 
19 We fit the data using individual lagged values of commodity prices, starting with j=1 and continuing up to j=30 
(more than one trading month). We then record the largest such lagged commodity value where the estimated slope 
coefficient of our regression model is statistically different from zero. This lag-length indicates the first statistically 
significant spillover of information from the chosen commodity market to industry level returns in question. 
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predictive content for future equity prices. Prior literature examining news generally finds such 
information is incorporated into stock returns in about a week or less (Schwert, 1981), with the 
bulk of evidence in favor of incorporation of data into prices in about one trading day (see, for 
example, Andersen et al., 2007, and Busse and Green, 2002). Driesprong et al. (2008) and Fan 
and Jahan-Parvar (2012) report underreaction to oil returns is concentrated within six trading 
weeks. Thus, the 30 trading days (six trading weeks) horizon considered in this paper should be 
sufficient to uncover the extent of the predictive ability of commodities for stock returns. 
Our analysis can be viewed as a test of the semi-strong form of efficient market hypothesis. 
In particular, we view lag lengths of greater than five trading days (one trading week) as clear 
evidence of “underreaction” since news announcements are impounded into stock returns at least 
within one trading week (Schwert, 1981; Pearce and Roley, 1985; Boyd et al., 2005). 
Empirical results are reported in Table 1. These support the existence of a delayed reaction in 
incorporating information stemming from the commodity markets in industry returns. As White 
(2000) argues, many studies in time series rely on using the same data set for multiple inferences, 
which inexorably leads to data snooping. That is why the statistical significance of results in 
Table 1 are based on data-mining robust critical values (described in section 4.4) in the spirit of 
Rapach and Wohar (2006) and Herrera et al. (2011) and are derived from a bootstrap procedure.  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the in-sample results. We recursively estimated regressions of the 
form of (4.2) where j is between one and 30 days. The reported statistics in columns 4 to 7 report 
these regression results for those commodities that are statistically significant at the 10% level 
using the data mining robust critical values derived from a bootstrap procedure. Thus, for 
industry return rit  (as in column number 2) and commodity price change  rt-jc  (reported in 
column 1), and where j signifies the number of lags reported in column 3, we report estimated 
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slope parameter, ji,αˆ (column 4), Newey-West HAC-consistent standard errors (column 5), 
Robust t-statistics (column 6), and finally, R2 for our predictive regression in column 7. 
Panel A of Table 1 provides clear evidence of delayed reaction and can be interpreted as 
providing further empirical support for the underreaction or gradual information diffusion 
hypothesis (Hong and Stein, 1999; Hong et al., 2007). We find 147 cases of significant 
predictability using the data mining robust procedure. It is clear that over 85% of industries in 
our sample are predictable (43 out of 49) at more than one period ahead, given very stringent 
significance criteria. Further the predictors are not at all confined to a small subset of 
commodities; we find about 72% of commodities (18 out of 25) show evidence of significant 
predictability.20 Thus, there is widespread evidence of underreaction. The length of 
underreaction lags varies between one day (11 cases) to over 20 trading days (70 cases).  The 
average lag length is 17.4 days and the median is 17 days. Thus, a large majority of cases have 
lag lengths not just larger than one trading week but larger than three trading weeks, and thus 
longer than much of the literature examining the response of equity prices to news (see for 
example, Schwert, 1981). Metals account for the bulk of evidence presented on Table 1. Further, 
many industries are predicted by commodities that are not directly used as their inputs. A good 
example is publishing (books) being led by gold base by more than 20 trading days.  
While a large body of literature is focused on oil prices and stock market returns (Driesprong 
et al., 2008; Killian and Park, 2009; Gogineni, 2010; and Fan and Jahan-Parvar, 2012; among 
many others), we find that the evidence of predictability and especially delayed reaction is much 
                                                          
20 If instead of adjusted critical values used here, we rely on conventional Student t-statistics based on Newey-West 
(1987) HAC standard errors, 40 out of 49 industries in our sample demonstrate evidence of underreaction of at least 
three trading weeks to information originating in commodity markets. Also, instead of 19 commodities accounting 
for underreaction, we have 25 commodities that demonstrate evidence of leading industries by three or more trading 
weeks. These results are available upon request, but are not reported to save space. 
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stronger when we consider fluctuations in precious metal returns. For energy-related 
commodities (crude oil, fuel oil, propane and gasoline), we have 23 cases of predictability. In 
comparison, we detect 43 cases of predictability based on precious metals returns (gold and 
silver). We conclude that we have found a sharp difference with much of the literature, in the 
sense that underreaction seems more concentrated in metals and not in energy commodities. It 
seems that future predictability research should examine both precious metals and energy.  
The fact that precious metals are so well represented in Table 1 may also be the result of their 
negative correlation with the business cycle and market conditions.21 Precious metals can be 
used as instruments to hedge against economic downturns. Thus, a positive (negative) movement 
in precious metal returns may signal worsening (improving) business conditions for cyclical 
industries such as real estate, building materials, insurance, and banking.  
Based on Table 1, we contend that the speed of diffusion of information from commodity 
markets to equity markets is slower than the five trading days or less, which is generally 
observed in the news announcements literature (Boyd et al., 2005; Anderson et al., 2007). In 
Table 1, for precious metals 37 cases of predictability are for lag lengths greater than 10 trading 
days; there are 27 cases where the lag length is in excess of 20 trading days.  These results 
suggest that the stock market, at least partly, does not immediately and fully respond to new 
information contained in commodity returns. In the U.S., there is no institutional barrier against 
the flow of information from commodity to equity markets. In fact, data on commodity 
movements is widely available and discussed in the financial and business press. Thus, the most 
plausible explanation for the slow reaction of industry stock returns (of more than five trading 
days; see Table 1) is the gradual diffusion of information across markets (Hong et al., 2007; 
                                                          
21 Vrugt et al. (2004) use variables related to the business cycle and the monetary environment to build dynamic 
timing strategies for metals. They find there is predictable variation in futures returns, which can be exploited. 
19 
Hong and Stein, 1999). Our results are especially interesting given that prior literature suggest 
the links between commodity and equity markets are often weak (Büyüksahin et al., 2010) and 
that (volatility) spillovers might flow primarily from equity market to commodity market (Malik 
and Hammoudeh, 2007). 22 
The gradual incorporation of commodity information into stock prices could also be linked to 
investor information processing issues and investor inattention (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). 
Given that the link between many commodities and sector stock returns is indirect, then investors 
might not be immediately aware of the full importance of individual commodity log price 
changes for specific equity market segments. Evidence of a longer delayed stock reaction when 
there is an indirect link to commodities is consistent with the investor inattention hypothesis.23 
For example, in Table 1, Brent predicts the oil industry returns - which it is most closely linked 
to - only one day ahead. However, Brent predicts the soda, building materials and business 
service industry returns at least 12 days ahead.24 
 
5.3. Out-of-Sample Forecast Ability 
                                                          
22 Büyüksahin et al. (2010) question how closely connected equity and commodity market are. They find evidence 
that correlations between the markets are time-varying and generally sufficiently weak to offer diversification 
benefits; however, they also note that equity and commodity markets move more closely during periods of market 
stress. 
23 Storage costs may or may not have an effect on our results. However, these costs may already be priced in some 
commodity markets ahead of transaction. Given that storage costs are likely heterogeneous across commodities, an 
exploration of the effect of storage costs on market reaction is outside the scope of this paper but a worthwhile 
endeavor for future extensions. 
24 As a demonstration for the impact of not using data-mining Student t-statistics, we present in-sample results for 
fuel oil based on conventional t-statistics, rather than data-mining robust values in Table A.3 (see online appendix). 
These results suggest that up to eight industry returns could be predicted by fuel oil at a lag length of generally more 
than 27 days. In contrast, Panel A of Table 1, which uses data-mining robust critical values, indicates that five 
industry returns underreact to fuel oil price changes and it takes 12 days for information contained in fuel oil returns 
to be incorporated into industry returns. Thus, the approach in Table 1 substantially reduces both the lag length and 
the number of times we fail to reject the underreaction null hypothesis, due to the stringent criteria we impose that 
explicitly accounts for data mining.  
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Table 1 Panel B reports results for the out-of-sample performance of our model. We fit 
equation (4.3) to data, and use equation (4.5) as our baseline model, following Goyal and Welch 
(2008) in using the historical average as the baseline model. We use all lags of the commodity 
return up to and including those found significant for forecasting given that section 5.2 identified 
the maximum lag length at which predictability is apparent. 
In column 8 of Table 1, we report Theil’s U statistic, corrected for Clark and West (2007) 
concerns. Since values less than unity Theil’s U statistic indicate superior forecast accuracy of 
the model investigated against a benchmark (in our case, historical average), this implies the 
existence of out-of-sample forecast ability for commodity returns. For 59.2% of cases (87 out of 
147) we find that the adjusted Theil’s U is less than 1, which is considerably higher than the 50% 
we may expect under the null of no predictability. 
Finally, in column 9 of Table 1, we report p-values for the Clark and West (2007) test of 
equal predictive accuracy. Lower p-values indicate that commodity price change-based forecasts 
have more forecasting power than historical mean-based forecasts. While we found 87 cases 
where the adjusted Theil’s U was less than 1, only in 28 of these cases is this statistically 
significant according to the Clark-West test at the 10% level. Hence only in 19% (28 out of 147) 
of cases are the in-sample results of statistical predictability corroborated in the out-of-sample 
tests. This is more than the 10% of cases we would anticipate to find purely by chance. We 
conjecture that the differences between the in-sample and out-of-sample results could be due to i) 
a change in the financial markets since our sample start date of 1985, ii) the existence of outliers 
and/or iii) in-sample tests possibly being more powerful than out-of-sample tests (Inoue and 
Kilian, 2005). We provide empirical analysis related to points i) and ii) and discuss point iii). 
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6. Robustness 
In this section we provide further analysis of underreaction to help us better understand the 
in-sample and out-of-sample tests reported in Section 5. The first issue we examine is whether 
the sample period impacts the out-of-sample results. Arguably, financial markets changed 
dramatically between the mid-1980s and the end of the millennium with huge increases in 
trading volumes and liquidity. Hence the early part of the sample may not be so useful in 
identifying in-sample relationships that are still apparent today. Terefore, in Table 2 we re-run 
our underreaction tests from Table 1 by changing the start date for the in-sample period from 
January 1985 to January 2000.25  
The main results in Table 2 (post-2000 out-of-sample) show similar numbers of cases of in-
sample predictability to Table 1 (141 versus 147). Some of the other results are broadly 
consistent with Table 1. For example, average lag length is more than three weeks at 20 days and 
median lag length is now 23 days, both of which remain much longer than would be generally 
considered consistent with market efficiency. Metals, especially precious metals feature even 
more prominently for the post-2000 sample (Table 2) and remain much more important than 
energy commodities, whereas agricultural and non-metal industrial commodities are only evident 
in a small number of cases. However, other results are much weaker. The out-of-sample results 
in terms of the Clark-West test are weaker compared to Table 1. For the post-2000 sample we 
find about 2% of cases (3 out of 141) are statistically significant, which is dramatically less than 
the 10% of cases you would expect under the null of no predictability and the 19% of cases we 
reported in Table 1. The proportion of cases where Theil’s U is less than 1 is also dramatically 
                                                          
25 While we use spot prices in this paper, one other justification for our sample split in 200 is the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) of 2000. 
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lower at about 37%, substantially less than the 50% anticipated under the null of no 
predictability.26  
Finally, Inoue and Kilian (2005) point out that out-of-sample tests may not be superior to in-
sample tests. In particular, in theoretical analysis they demonstrate that out-of-sample tests can 
be less powerful than in-sample tests. It is also the case that either the in-sample test or the out-
of-sample test could falsely reject the null. Consequently, it can be anticipated that out-of-sample 
tests will not fully corroborate in-sample tests due to these two factors. Nevertheless, that we 
find some cases where both in-sample and out-of-sample results indicate that predictability does 
exist strongly suggests that predictability of stock returns by commodities cannot be fully 
attributed to data mining. 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
This study provides further evidence on the delayed reaction hypothesis of Hong and Stein 
(1999). We use a variation of Hong et al. (2007) slow diffusion of information methodology and 
implement procedures to account for data mining, building upon Herrera et al. (2011). We 
examine the relationship between a wide range of different commodities and industry stock 
returns. The paper primarily extends the literature in three directions. First, related prior work 
examines whether there is a delayed reaction to information. In contrast, this paper aims to 
identify how long it takes for information to be fully incorporated into prices. Second, prior 
research focuses on information that has a direct economic link to stock returns, but this paper 
                                                          
26 For robustness, we re-estimated our model with a second sample that excluded observations that were five 
standard deviations from the mean. Both samples yielded a similar number of cases of in-sample predictability. 
Conversely, the median lag length in the second was dramatically reduced compared to results in Table 1. Our 
results suggest that extreme returns partly drive the long lag lengths. A table with those results is available upon 
request. 
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additionally provides a widespread investigation of information with only indirect links to stock 
returns. Third, we are one of the first studies in the delayed reaction literature to explicitly 
account for data mining and to investigate out-of-sample forecasting power. 
One key improvement over that of previous literature is that we measure the specific length 
of time for commodity price information to be fully incorporated into stock prices. To meet this 
objective, we use daily data and examine a much broader range of commodities. Empirical 
results indicate that a large sub-sample of commodities predict industry stock returns. There is 
evidence that it can take more than two trading weeks (and often more than four trading weeks) 
for commodity information to be fully incorporated into stock returns, indicating that there is a 
substantial delay before information originating in commodity markets is fully incorporated into 
asset prices. We also find that some of the longer delayed reaction can be attributed to outlying 
observations. Nonetheless, the length of delay is substantially longer than for news 
announcements, which tends to be incorporated into asset prices within a week (Schwert, 1981; 
Boyd et al., 2005). These results imply that traders have limited information processing power or 
sometimes neglect relevant information. Thus, our evidence lends support for the gradual 
diffusion of information that was introduced by Hong and Stein (1999) and Hong et al. (2007).  
We also provide evidence that many commodities Granger cause a wide range of other 
commodity prices. In particular, we find that precious metals Granger cause almost all other 
commodities reported in this study. These results provide new and novel evidence of gradual 
information diffusion within the commodity market that extends prior findings of delayed 
reaction within the equity market (Hong et al., 2007). 
This paper documents the extent of underreaction in industry returns to information 
contained by commodity prices. We provide empirical evidence that there are cases of 
24 
substantial delays in response to this information, which cannot be fully explained by data 
mining. While out-of-sample predictability is not especially strong, we interpret this result to be 
in line with Inoue and Kilian (2005) who find that in-sample tests are more powerful than out-of-
sample tests. We do not attempt to place a deep economic interpretation on our results, as 
identification of the source of shocks to commodity prices is beyond the scope of our 
investigation. Future research could investigate more fully how particular types of commodity 
shocks might affect the link between non-energy commodities and industry stock returns.   
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Table 1: Underreaction in Industry Returns 
      Panel A: In-Sample Results (1985-2010) Panel B: Out-of-Sample Results 
Commodity Industry Lags Slope 
NW St 
Err Robust t-Stat 
R-
Squared Theil's Adj. U CW p-value 
Brent Soda 17 -0.0310 0.0085 -3.636 0.2018 0.9943 0.0705 
Brent BldMt 28 -0.0254 0.0069 -3.655 0.2042 1.0117 0.9221 
Brent Oil 1 0.0325 0.0076 4.297 0.2809 0.9985 0.3114 
Brent BusSv 12 -0.0225 0.0062 -3.655 0.2037 0.9987 0.3948 
Brent Softw 12 -0.0327 0.0091 -3.583 0.1958 0.9967 0.2510 
WTI Cnstr 11 -0.0348 0.0087 -4.017 0.2460 0.9961 0.3070 
WTI Insur 1 -0.0325 0.0065 -5.017 0.3826 0.9945 0.1339 
FuelOil Txtls 12 -0.0315 0.0074 -4.281 0.2793 0.9975 0.3628 
FuelOil Gold 10 0.0461 0.0119 3.878 0.2293 0.9941 0.2337 
FuelOil Banks 12 -0.0311 0.0080 -3.900 0.2319 0.9848 0.1432 
FuelOil Insur 12 -0.0231 0.0062 -3.728 0.2119 0.9922 0.2550 
FuelOil RlEst 12 -0.0298 0.0074 -4.037 0.2485 0.9934 0.2895 
Propane MedEq 12 -0.0222 0.0062 -3.610 0.1987 0.9906 0.0572 
Propane Chems 7 0.0245 0.0069 3.535 0.1905 1.0048 0.7560 
Propane Cnstr 12 -0.0311 0.0088 -3.528 0.1899 0.9922 0.1448 
Propane Ships 12 -0.0275 0.0073 -3.746 0.2140 0.9872 0.0616 
Propane Softw 12 -0.0314 0.0089 -3.528 0.1898 0.9898 0.0589 
Propane Whlsl 12 -0.0217 0.0054 -3.993 0.2431 0.9912 0.0771 
Propane Meals 12 -0.0224 0.0063 -3.582 0.1958 0.9927 0.1181 
Propane Banks 21 -0.0304 0.0085 -3.575 0.1952 0.9969 0.3877 
Gasoline Soda 22 0.0270 0.0073 3.697 0.2088 1.0037 0.6691 
Gasoline Insur 1 -0.0261 0.0058 -4.511 0.3095 0.9931 0.0954 
Gasoline RlEst 17 -0.0263 0.0069 -3.803 0.2207 0.9839 0.1550 
WheatNo2 Rubbr 24 -0.0325 0.0090 -3.601 0.1981 1.0048 0.7685 
WheatNo2 Guns 15 0.0409 0.0108 3.785 0.2186 1.0022 0.6752 
WheatNo2 Coal 9 0.0647 0.0183 3.529 0.1899 0.9841 0.0280 
WheatNo2 Banks 25 0.0442 0.0122 3.619 0.2002 1.0209 0.9587 
WheatNo2 RlEst 19 0.0419 0.0113 3.715 0.2107 1.0000 0.4980 
WheatNo2 Fin 25 0.0462 0.0127 3.638 0.2022 1.0195 0.9707 
SpringWheat Mines 23 0.0434 0.0117 3.723 0.2118 0.9982 0.4454 
SpringWheat Coal 13 -0.0630 0.0169 -3.735 0.2128 0.9933 0.2997 
Oats Books 6 -0.0292 0.0073 -3.991 0.2426 1.0093 0.8546 
Oats Txtls 18 0.0319 0.0085 3.736 0.2131 1.0160 0.9194 
Oats FabPr 8 -0.0326 0.0089 -3.653 0.2034 0.9832 0.0621 
Oats Autos 8 -0.0367 0.0091 -4.051 0.2501 0.9885 0.2082 
Oats Gold 5 -0.0485 0.0137 -3.528 0.1897 1.0020 0.5836 
Oats BusSv 6 -0.0232 0.0065 -3.537 0.1907 1.0082 0.8980 
Oats Chips 6 -0.0395 0.0103 -3.820 0.2223 1.0078 0.9326 
Oats Banks 6 -0.0416 0.0092 -4.508 0.3094 1.0049 0.6908 
Oats Insur 14 -0.0287 0.0072 -4.005 0.2446 0.9932 0.2114 
Oats RlEst 6 -0.0392 0.0085 -4.594 0.3212 1.0155 0.8848 
29 
      Panel A: In-Sample Results (1985-2010) Panel B: Out-of-Sample Results 
Commodity Industry Lags Slope 
NW St 
Err Robust t-Stat 
R-
Squared Theil's Adj. U CW p-value 
Oats RlEst 8 -0.0342 0.0085 -4.006 0.2445 0.9704 0.1455 
Oats Fin 6 -0.0405 0.0096 -4.217 0.2708 1.0079 0.8548 
SoyaOil Gold 22 -0.0693 0.0195 -3.564 0.1941 1.0004 0.5140 
SoyaOil Oil 10 -0.0423 0.0114 -3.720 0.2110 1.0018 0.6341 
Copper Txtls 13 0.0403 0.0112 3.596 0.1973 1.0073 0.8060 
Copper Cnstr 8 -0.0454 0.0126 -3.604 0.1980 0.9882 0.0309 
Copper Util 25 0.0273 0.0073 3.768 0.2170 0.9991 0.4547 
Copper Banks 13 0.0455 0.0121 3.748 0.2143 1.0158 0.9029 
Copper RlEst 13 0.0450 0.0112 4.003 0.2443 1.0125 0.8570 
Aluminum Beer 1 -0.0460 0.0124 -3.700 0.2084 0.9979 0.0307 
Aluminum Hshld 1 -0.0429 0.0112 -3.832 0.2236 0.9973 0.0365 
Aluminum Drugs 1 -0.0445 0.0121 -3.669 0.2050 0.9974 0.0405 
Aluminum Meals 1 -0.0490 0.0119 -4.102 0.2561 0.9956 0.0240 
Aluminum Banks 1 -0.0651 0.0162 -4.018 0.2457 0.9919 0.0282 
Aluminum Insur 1 -0.0486 0.0126 -3.863 0.2272 0.9936 0.0239 
Aluminum RlEst 13 0.0548 0.0150 3.646 0.2027 1.0144 0.9717 
Aluminum Fin 1 -0.0599 0.0169 -3.556 0.1926 0.9913 0.0288 
Nickel Fun 3 0.0396 0.0104 3.793 0.2191 0.9950 0.2717 
Nickel RlEst 13 0.0324 0.0092 3.520 0.1890 1.0166 0.9297 
Cotton1 Toys 25 0.0735 0.0183 4.018 0.2466 1.0057 0.8335 
Cotton1 Books 25 0.0566 0.0159 3.554 0.1931 1.0003 0.5212 
Cotton1 Rubbr 23 -0.0544 0.0149 -3.650 0.2035 1.0029 0.7123 
Cotton1 Whlsl 25 0.0507 0.0128 3.950 0.2383 0.9998 0.4800 
Cotton1 Rtail 23 -0.0602 0.0159 -3.786 0.2190 1.0009 0.5828 
Cotton1 RlEst 25 0.0802 0.0186 4.307 0.2833 0.9993 0.4676 
Cotton2 Soda 27 0.0394 0.0100 3.946 0.2380 1.0032 0.6618 
Cotton2 Hshld 27 0.0264 0.0070 3.753 0.2153 1.0025 0.6548 
Cotton2 MedEq 27 0.0275 0.0074 3.724 0.2120 1.0081 0.8617 
Cotton2 Drugs 27 0.0307 0.0076 4.023 0.2473 1.0054 0.8228 
Cotton2 Chems 27 0.0337 0.0083 4.045 0.2501 1.0068 0.7683 
Cotton2 BldMt 27 0.0332 0.0081 4.085 0.2550 1.0080 0.8245 
Cotton2 Cnstr 27 0.0387 0.0106 3.659 0.2046 1.0127 0.8828 
Cotton2 Mines 27 0.0442 0.0106 4.166 0.2651 1.0067 0.7029 
Cotton2 Paper 27 0.0260 0.0074 3.525 0.1900 1.0025 0.6360 
Cotton2 Trans 27 0.0291 0.0080 3.658 0.2046 1.0019 0.5949 
Cotton2 Whlsl 27 0.0266 0.0065 4.090 0.2556 1.0062 0.8166 
Cotton2 Other 27 0.0376 0.0091 4.113 0.2584 1.0009 0.5468 
GoldBuillon Gold 1 -0.1210 0.0320 -3.778 0.2173 1.0008 0.8827 
GoldBuillon Mines 15 0.0983 0.0224 4.385 0.2932 0.9836 0.1328 
GoldBuillon Coal 15 0.1467 0.0325 4.517 0.3110 0.9776 0.1236 
GoldBuillon Util 10 -0.0467 0.0128 -3.638 0.2018 1.0004 0.5310 
GoldBuillon Banks 23 -0.0932 0.0216 -4.320 0.2849 0.9790 0.1223 
GoldBuillon Insur 23 -0.0843 0.0167 -5.038 0.3871 0.9819 0.0864 
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      Panel A: In-Sample Results (1985-2010) Panel B: Out-of-Sample Results 
Commodity Industry Lags Slope 
NW St 
Err Robust t-Stat 
R-
Squared Theil's Adj. U CW p-value 
GoldBuillon RlEst 23 -0.0816 0.0200 -4.088 0.2552 0.9843 0.1638 
GoldBase Soda 30 0.0724 0.0203 3.561 0.1939 1.0079 0.7516 
GoldBase Fun 10 -0.0824 0.0217 -3.792 0.2192 0.9983 0.4297 
GoldBase Books 28 0.0811 0.0164 4.941 0.3726 0.9850 0.1445 
GoldBase Chems 28 0.0636 0.0169 3.752 0.2152 0.9807 0.0857 
GoldBase BldMt 29 -0.0608 0.0166 -3.668 0.2058 0.9868 0.1426 
GoldBase Cnstr 7 -0.0764 0.0215 -3.553 0.1924 1.0047 0.7532 
GoldBase Steel 28 0.1016 0.0230 4.419 0.2984 0.9744 0.0920 
GoldBase FabPr 28 0.0759 0.0200 3.788 0.2194 0.9868 0.2098 
GoldBase Mach 28 0.0873 0.0183 4.759 0.3458 0.9791 0.0826 
GoldBase ElcEq 28 0.0688 0.0190 3.610 0.1993 0.9808 0.0918 
GoldBase Ships 7 -0.0653 0.0179 -3.658 0.2039 1.0055 0.7817 
GoldBase Mines 28 0.1026 0.0216 4.753 0.3449 0.9756 0.1102 
GoldBase Coal 15 0.1318 0.0312 4.220 0.2716 1.0047 0.5882 
GoldBase Oil 28 0.0796 0.0181 4.409 0.2969 0.9750 0.0614 
GoldBase Util 11 -0.0540 0.0123 -4.380 0.2923 1.0021 0.6262 
GoldBase Telcm 11 -0.0623 0.0160 -3.886 0.2302 1.0035 0.6630 
GoldBase Telcm 28 0.0660 0.0161 4.110 0.2581 0.9830 0.0892 
GoldBase BusSv 29 -0.0605 0.0147 -4.111 0.2583 0.9930 0.2263 
GoldBase Hardw 28 0.0867 0.0235 3.691 0.2083 0.9835 0.0913 
GoldBase Softw 7 -0.0763 0.0217 -3.514 0.1882 1.0002 0.5166 
GoldBase Trans 28 0.0627 0.0162 3.870 0.2290 0.9803 0.0549 
GoldBase Whlsl 29 -0.0505 0.0132 -3.812 0.2221 0.9898 0.1328 
GoldBase Banks 29 -0.0814 0.0208 -3.920 0.2349 0.9885 0.2656 
GoldBase Insur 29 -0.0757 0.0161 -4.698 0.3371 0.9961 0.3851 
GoldBase RlEst 28 0.0950 0.0192 4.951 0.3742 0.9765 0.0978 
GoldBase Fin 29 -0.0782 0.0216 -3.624 0.2008 0.9918 0.3109 
Platinum Books 11 -0.0410 0.0112 -3.672 0.2056 0.9981 0.3717 
Platinum Chems 11 -0.0417 0.0115 -3.623 0.2002 0.9991 0.4339 
Platinum Rubbr 11 -0.0409 0.0104 -3.920 0.2343 1.0002 0.5176 
Platinum BldMt 11 -0.0451 0.0113 -4.005 0.2446 0.9986 0.3876 
Platinum Guns 23 -0.0456 0.0125 -3.640 0.2024 1.0033 0.6870 
Platinum Oil 11 -0.0579 0.0123 -4.717 0.3389 0.9988 0.4191 
Platinum Util 11 -0.0368 0.0084 -4.385 0.2930 1.0000 0.4986 
Platinum Boxes 11 -0.0439 0.0120 -3.657 0.2040 1.0010 0.5644 
Platinum Banks 11 -0.0548 0.0141 -3.885 0.2302 1.0043 0.6670 
Platinum Insur 11 -0.0446 0.0109 -4.080 0.2537 1.0012 0.5639 
Platinum RlEst 11 -0.0463 0.0130 -3.553 0.1925 1.0037 0.6866 
Silver Chems 30 0.0330 0.0084 3.923 0.2353 0.9919 0.1694 
Silver Steel 30 0.0406 0.0114 3.549 0.1926 0.9894 0.2141 
Silver FabPr 30 0.0403 0.0100 4.050 0.2508 0.9900 0.2077 
Silver Mach 30 0.0345 0.0091 3.784 0.2189 0.9919 0.2168 
Silver Mines 14 0.0414 0.0107 3.874 0.2289 0.9844 0.0462 
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      Panel A: In-Sample Results (1985-2010) Panel B: Out-of-Sample Results 
Commodity Industry Lags Slope 
NW St 
Err Robust t-Stat 
R-
Squared Theil's Adj. U CW p-value 
Silver BusSv 29 -0.0273 0.0073 -3.736 0.2135 0.9989 0.4406 
Silver Whlsl 29 -0.0237 0.0066 -3.598 0.1980 0.9973 0.3484 
Silver Whlsl 30 0.0249 0.0066 3.783 0.2188 0.9966 0.3229 
Silver Insur 29 -0.0296 0.0080 -3.702 0.2095 1.0039 0.6677 
Silver RlEst 11 -0.0340 0.0095 -3.575 0.1949 1.0077 0.8543 
S&P GSCI 
Coffee  
LabEq 14 0.0316 0.0083 3.830 0.2238 1.0000 0.5042 
S&P GSCI 
Cocoa  
Meals 23 -0.0291 0.0082 -3.538 0.1913 1.0046 0.7829 
S&P GSCI 
Lean Hogs  
Clths 7 0.0392 0.0111 3.532 0.1902 1.0065 0.9057 
S&P GSCI 
Lean Hogs  
Util 26 0.0279 0.0079 3.534 0.1910 1.0126 0.9809 
S&P GSCI 
Lean Hogs  
Other 26 0.0427 0.0118 3.606 0.1988 1.0075 0.8565 
S&P GSCI 
Live Cattle  
Fun 21 -0.0874 0.0235 -3.722 0.2116 0.9893 0.1163 
S&P GSCI 
Live Cattle  
Books 21 -0.0662 0.0177 -3.742 0.2138 0.9970 0.3399 
S&P GSCI 
Live Cattle  
Clths 21 -0.0675 0.0188 -3.586 0.1965 0.9977 0.3625 
S&P GSCI 
Live Cattle  
BldMt 21 -0.0716 0.0178 -4.014 0.2460 0.9931 0.1907 
S&P GSCI 
Live Cattle  
Cnstr 21 -0.0827 0.0232 -3.559 0.1935 0.9846 0.0903 
S&P GSCI 
Live Cattle  
Steel 21 -0.0989 0.0248 -3.989 0.2429 0.9965 0.3894 
S&P GSCI 
Live Cattle  
Mach 21 -0.0811 0.0198 -4.105 0.2573 0.9925 0.1963 
S&P GSCI 
Live Cattle  
Paper 17 -0.0570 0.0162 -3.520 0.1891 0.9985 0.3874 
S&P GSCI 
Live Cattle  
Trans 21 -0.0646 0.0175 -3.697 0.2087 0.9976 0.3324 
S&P GSCI 
Live Cattle  
Whlsl 21 -0.0563 0.0143 -3.943 0.2373 0.9959 0.2277 
 
Notes: Table 1 presents the results for underreaction and out-of-sample predictability tests, discussed in Sections 4.2-4.4, for the full sample 
period. The first column denotes the commodity log price changes used for testing, the second column reports the industry return (dependent 
variable), the third column denotes the lag length of the commodity return included in the regression. Columns 4-7, corresponding to Panel 
A, report the estimated coefficient for the commodity return, the Newey-West standard error, the Robust t-statistics, and the coefficient of 
determination, respectively.  
The Robust t-statistic corresponds to tests that reject the null hypothesis of no predictability at 10% or smaller based on the correction method 
of Rapach and Wohar (2006) and Herrera, et al. (2011) which address data-mining concerns. Using this methodology, absolute critical values 
are 3.5132. The lag length reported was determined by regressing the industry return on individual lagged values of the commodity returns 
starting from lag 1 and up to lag 30 and recording the longest individual lagged return that is statistically significant, given the adjusted 
critical values. The reported results are based from regressions of Equation 4.2:  
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t rr εαµ ++= −,,   where rt
i is industry i’s returns, 
µi,j and αi,j are real-valued parameters, rt-jc represent jth-lagged percentage change commodity c’s spot prices, and εti is the error term. 
For the out-of-sample part we want to know how much forecast power there is from all lags up to the maximal significant lag length (S). 
Hence we estimate multivariate regressions of Equation 4.3: , ,
1
.µ α ε+ − +
=
= + +∑
S
i c i
t m i j i j t j t m
j
r r  over a five year rolling window to 
estimate the co-efficient values for the forecast, which are then used to generate the forecasts using equation 4.4. Column 8 under Panel B 
reports the adjusted Theil’s U and Column 9 reports the p-value of the Clark-West (2007) test statistic; both these measures adjust for the 
parameter uncertainty associated with estimating the alternative model under the assumption of no predictability. 
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Table 2: Underreaction in Industry Returns (Post-2000) 
      Panel A: In-Sample Results (2000-2010) Panel B: Out-of-Sample Results 
Commodity Industry Lags Slope 
NW St 
Err Robust t-Stat 
R-
Squared Theil's Adj. U CW p-value 
PorkBelly Hlth 26 -0.0259 0.0069 -3.760 0.5157 1.0027 0.6863 
PorkBelly Txtls 26 -0.0351 0.0099 -3.550 0.4598 1.0189 0.9771 
WTI Hshld 1 -0.0334 0.0092 -3.628 0.4759 1.0010 0.6458 
WTI Drugs 5 -0.0358 0.0095 -3.766 0.5132 1.0019 0.6762 
WTI Boxes 8 -0.0463 0.0122 -3.807 0.5252 1.0000 0.5018 
WTI Banks 13 0.0589 0.0166 3.544 0.4561 1.0168 0.9286 
WTI Insur 1 -0.0571 0.0126 -4.525 0.7381 1.0024 0.6806 
WTI RlEst 13 0.0533 0.0153 3.484 0.4408 1.0107 0.8318 
WTI RlEst 27 0.0537 0.0153 3.505 0.4485 0.9629 0.0159 
WTI Fin 16 0.0677 0.0175 3.860 0.5411 0.9991 0.4718 
FuelOil Hshld 29 0.0309 0.0080 3.856 0.5426 1.0025 0.6614 
FuelOil Gold 10 0.0629 0.0178 3.522 0.4500 1.0068 0.7694 
FuelOil Banks 13 0.0530 0.0146 3.627 0.4775 1.0280 0.9717 
Propane Drugs 7 0.0342 0.0097 3.529 0.4513 1.0086 0.9606 
Propane Chems 7 0.0462 0.0131 3.518 0.4486 1.0139 0.9848 
Propane Gold 2 -0.0748 0.0207 -3.617 0.4731 0.9861 0.0429 
Propane Oil 5 -0.0592 0.0139 -4.266 0.6578 0.9880 0.0567 
Gasoline Cnstr 16 0.0465 0.0133 3.509 0.4478 1.0110 0.8340 
Gasoline Ships 16 0.0369 0.0098 3.778 0.5185 1.0015 0.5873 
Gasoline Banks 13 0.0518 0.0131 3.964 0.5701 1.0074 0.6983 
Gasoline Insur 13 0.0361 0.0099 3.638 0.4805 1.0024 0.5891 
Gasoline RlEst 13 0.0460 0.0120 3.830 0.5324 0.9975 0.4280 
Gasoline Fin 16 0.0484 0.0138 3.511 0.4482 1.0075 0.6864 
WheatNo2 Rubbr 24 -0.0575 0.0144 -3.999 0.5823 1.0059 0.8045 
Oats Books 6 -0.0452 0.0118 -3.823 0.5290 0.9960 0.2755 
Oats Books 10 0.0455 0.0118 3.860 0.5400 1.0163 0.9707 
Oats ElcEq 10 0.0522 0.0133 3.926 0.5586 1.0101 0.9174 
Oats Gold 5 -0.1054 0.0198 -5.326 1.0214 0.9918 0.2626 
Oats Telcm 6 -0.0413 0.0116 -3.563 0.4598 0.9980 0.3391 
Oats BusSv 6 -0.0373 0.0106 -3.516 0.4478 0.9976 0.3207 
Oats Chips 6 -0.0619 0.0173 -3.588 0.4664 0.9985 0.3741 
Oats Banks 10 0.0589 0.0163 3.625 0.4765 1.0170 0.9252 
Oats Insur 14 -0.0463 0.0124 -3.746 0.5096 1.0028 0.6183 
Oats RlEst 6 -0.0780 0.0149 -5.235 0.9874 0.9929 0.2604 
Oats Fin 10 0.0626 0.0171 3.650 0.4832 1.0172 0.9530 
Oats Other 18 0.0448 0.0127 3.539 0.4557 0.9971 0.3570 
SoyaOil LabEq 24 -0.0832 0.0212 -3.920 0.5596 1.0021 0.6222 
Copper Rubbr 13 0.0539 0.0145 3.716 0.5012 0.9997 0.4840 
Copper Txtls 13 0.0777 0.0196 3.970 0.5717 0.9996 0.4821 
Copper Guns 13 0.0583 0.0161 3.623 0.4765 0.9989 0.4435 
Copper Util 25 0.0469 0.0127 3.706 0.5007 0.9973 0.3640 
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      Panel A: In-Sample Results (2000-2010) Panel B: Out-of-Sample Results 
Commodity Industry Lags Slope 
NW St 
Err Robust t-Stat 
R-
Squared Theil's Adj. U CW p-value 
Copper Banks 13 0.0758 0.0211 3.590 0.4681 0.9982 0.4420 
Copper RlEst 13 0.0771 0.0194 3.971 0.5720 0.9960 0.3673 
Aluminum MedEq 13 0.0620 0.0173 3.584 0.4664 0.9998 0.4813 
Aluminum Autos 13 0.0971 0.0279 3.483 0.4406 1.0026 0.6713 
Aluminum Banks 13 0.1195 0.0302 3.954 0.5671 0.9998 0.4927 
Aluminum RlEst 13 0.1106 0.0278 3.974 0.5728 1.0011 0.5566 
Nickel Fun 3 0.0616 0.0168 3.676 0.4889 1.0040 0.6920 
Nickel Hlth 13 0.0398 0.0109 3.658 0.4857 1.0058 0.8427 
Cotton1 Toys 25 0.1042 0.0256 4.065 0.6017 0.9968 0.2747 
Cotton1 Books 25 0.1057 0.0252 4.199 0.6418 0.9965 0.2493 
Cotton1 Rubbr 23 -0.0849 0.0239 -3.556 0.4608 1.0003 0.5196 
Cotton1 ElcEq 23 -0.0997 0.0284 -3.511 0.4494 0.9997 0.4812 
Cotton1 Util 23 -0.0730 0.0208 -3.517 0.4508 1.0014 0.6439 
Cotton1 PerSv 16 -0.0902 0.0239 -3.778 0.5187 1.0037 0.8210 
Cotton1 Paper 23 -0.0776 0.0219 -3.540 0.4567 1.0004 0.5314 
Cotton1 Whlsl 25 0.0791 0.0206 3.842 0.5381 0.9984 0.3392 
Cotton1 Rtail 23 -0.0898 0.0237 -3.787 0.5223 1.0008 0.5750 
Cotton1 Meals 23 -0.0778 0.0219 -3.548 0.4588 1.0013 0.6138 
Cotton1 Insur 25 0.0994 0.0265 3.753 0.5134 0.9996 0.4715 
Cotton2 Coal 18 -0.1085 0.0304 -3.572 0.4642 0.9956 0.3669 
GoldBuillon Fun 15 0.1293 0.0367 3.522 0.4508 0.9951 0.3429 
GoldBuillon Hshld 23 -0.0714 0.0203 -3.520 0.4515 0.9928 0.1347 
GoldBuillon Rubbr 12 -0.0904 0.0253 -3.571 0.4630 0.9983 0.4085 
GoldBuillon BldMt 12 -0.1040 0.0275 -3.780 0.5183 0.9994 0.4714 
GoldBuillon Mines 15 0.1611 0.0391 4.116 0.6146 0.9969 0.4088 
GoldBuillon Coal 15 0.2647 0.0546 4.851 0.8519 0.9888 0.2646 
GoldBuillon Banks 23 -0.1476 0.0369 -3.998 0.5818 0.9790 0.1264 
GoldBuillon Insur 23 -0.1397 0.0280 -4.980 0.9001 0.9869 0.1600 
GoldBase Fun 28 0.1280 0.0362 3.533 0.4558 1.0134 0.7973 
GoldBase Books 28 0.1398 0.0263 5.320 1.0277 1.0072 0.7041 
GoldBase Hshld 28 0.0747 0.0199 3.748 0.5126 1.0029 0.6203 
GoldBase Chems 28 0.1204 0.0282 4.265 0.6628 0.9992 0.4760 
GoldBase BldMt 29 -0.0980 0.0272 -3.598 0.4729 1.0118 0.8387 
GoldBase Steel 28 0.1654 0.0414 3.998 0.5830 0.9995 0.4885 
GoldBase FabPr 28 0.1389 0.0348 3.987 0.5797 1.0038 0.5950 
GoldBase Mach 28 0.1626 0.0315 5.161 0.9677 1.0020 0.5539 
GoldBase ElcEq 28 0.1379 0.0297 4.641 0.7838 0.9996 0.4886 
GoldBase Ships 7 -0.1033 0.0272 -3.804 0.5241 1.0042 0.7342 
GoldBase Gold 22 -0.1861 0.0442 -4.208 0.6439 0.9957 0.3962 
GoldBase Mines 28 0.1790 0.0387 4.627 0.7794 0.9968 0.4327 
GoldBase Coal 28 0.1920 0.0538 3.568 0.4648 0.9987 0.4787 
GoldBase Oil 28 0.1312 0.0298 4.396 0.7041 1.0011 0.5292 
GoldBase Util 11 -0.0772 0.0217 -3.559 0.4598 1.0091 0.9294 
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      Panel A: In-Sample Results (2000-2010) Panel B: Out-of-Sample Results 
Commodity Industry Lags Slope 
NW St 
Err Robust t-Stat 
R-
Squared Theil's Adj. U CW p-value 
GoldBase Telcm 28 0.1043 0.0260 4.016 0.5882 1.0072 0.7281 
GoldBase BusSv 29 -0.0854 0.0238 -3.592 0.4713 1.0078 0.7932 
GoldBase Hardw 28 0.1502 0.0381 3.948 0.5686 1.0115 0.8388 
GoldBase Softw 28 0.1197 0.0308 3.884 0.5505 1.0102 0.8357 
GoldBase Paper 28 0.0830 0.0230 3.613 0.4765 1.0051 0.6831 
GoldBase Trans 28 0.0991 0.0262 3.786 0.5231 1.0056 0.6849 
GoldBase Whlsl 29 -0.0805 0.0215 -3.738 0.5101 1.0050 0.7024 
GoldBase Rtail 28 0.0881 0.0248 3.550 0.4603 1.0103 0.8679 
GoldBase Banks 28 0.1524 0.0364 4.189 0.6397 1.0062 0.6259 
GoldBase Insur 29 -0.1166 0.0277 -4.208 0.6456 1.0174 0.8978 
GoldBase RlEst 28 0.1587 0.0335 4.741 0.8178 1.0069 0.6519 
GoldBase Fin 28 0.1630 0.0384 4.241 0.6556 1.0152 0.8048 
Platinum Beer 11 -0.0608 0.0146 -4.160 0.6271 0.9965 0.1860 
Platinum Books 18 0.0673 0.0192 3.516 0.4497 1.0075 0.8307 
Platinum Hshld 1 -0.0533 0.0146 -3.653 0.4823 1.0004 0.5908 
Platinum BldMt 11 -0.0702 0.0197 -3.560 0.4600 0.9968 0.2552 
Platinum Oil 11 -0.0917 0.0217 -4.234 0.6492 0.9991 0.4400 
Platinum Util 11 -0.0560 0.0158 -3.546 0.4564 0.9984 0.3565 
Platinum Banks 11 -0.1026 0.0264 -3.886 0.5476 0.9978 0.4222 
Platinum Insur 11 -0.0725 0.0201 -3.614 0.4739 0.9917 0.1396 
Palladium Clths 9 -0.0514 0.0139 -3.700 0.4964 0.9985 0.4000 
Palladium FabPr 30 0.0608 0.0173 3.505 0.4490 1.0014 0.5410 
Silver Fun 30 0.0759 0.0211 3.599 0.4732 1.0097 0.8175 
Silver Hshld 30 0.0453 0.0116 3.905 0.5566 0.9983 0.3884 
Silver Clths 29 -0.0624 0.0163 -3.823 0.5336 1.0040 0.7071 
Silver Hlth 30 0.0513 0.0137 3.749 0.5133 1.0032 0.7017 
Silver Drugs 30 0.0450 0.0121 3.727 0.5073 1.0007 0.5456 
Silver Chems 30 0.0737 0.0164 4.486 0.7333 1.0084 0.8529 
Silver Rubbr 30 0.0692 0.0145 4.761 0.8252 1.0060 0.7766 
Silver BldMt 30 0.0685 0.0158 4.327 0.6826 1.0089 0.8399 
Silver Steel 30 0.1030 0.0241 4.280 0.6680 1.0218 0.9596 
Silver FabPr 30 0.0933 0.0203 4.604 0.7721 1.0101 0.8196 
Silver Mach 30 0.0890 0.0184 4.851 0.8566 1.0096 0.8406 
Silver ElcEq 30 0.0840 0.0173 4.855 0.8577 1.0085 0.8107 
Silver Autos 29 -0.0706 0.0195 -3.612 0.4765 0.9989 0.4528 
Silver Aero 30 0.0626 0.0166 3.779 0.5215 1.0047 0.7318 
Silver Ships 30 0.0588 0.0159 3.703 0.5009 1.0057 0.7465 
Silver Guns 29 -0.0586 0.0161 -3.633 0.4820 1.0004 0.5217 
Silver Mines 14 0.0841 0.0224 3.761 0.5136 0.9988 0.4466 
Silver Telcm 30 0.0573 0.0151 3.786 0.5233 1.0074 0.8013 
Silver PerSv 30 0.0561 0.0147 3.827 0.5348 1.0047 0.7416 
Silver BusSv 30 0.0618 0.0138 4.468 0.7276 1.0065 0.8092 
Silver Hardw 30 0.0874 0.0222 3.942 0.5671 1.0106 0.8603 
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      Panel A: In-Sample Results (2000-2010) Panel B: Out-of-Sample Results 
Commodity Industry Lags Slope 
NW St 
Err Robust t-Stat 
R-
Squared Theil's Adj. U CW p-value 
Silver Softw 30 0.0657 0.0180 3.659 0.4891 1.0058 0.7691 
Silver Chips 30 0.1007 0.0225 4.484 0.7326 1.0059 0.7365 
Silver LabEq 30 0.0771 0.0183 4.205 0.6450 1.0068 0.8191 
Silver Paper 30 0.0550 0.0134 4.113 0.6171 1.0056 0.7981 
Silver Boxes 30 0.0751 0.0155 4.847 0.8549 1.0023 0.6102 
Silver Trans 30 0.0662 0.0152 4.349 0.6894 1.0077 0.8335 
Silver Whlsl 30 0.0628 0.0125 5.024 0.9181 1.0057 0.7828 
Silver Meals 30 0.0594 0.0134 4.445 0.7201 1.0062 0.8288 
Silver Banks 29 -0.0798 0.0212 -3.765 0.5175 1.0005 0.5196 
Silver Insur 29 -0.0668 0.0161 -4.146 0.6267 1.0005 0.5230 
Silver RlEst 29 -0.0689 0.0195 -3.528 0.4546 0.9991 0.4650 
Silver Fin 29 -0.0840 0.0224 -3.750 0.5134 0.9994 0.4766 
Sugar Chems 5 -0.0291 0.0083 -3.519 0.4484 1.0013 0.5948 
Cocoa Meals 30 -0.0577 0.0140 -4.136 0.6241 1.0012 0.5755 
S&P GSCI 
Lean Hogs  Hlth 28 0.0579 0.0163 3.546 0.4591 1.0040 0.7151 
 
 
Notes: Table 2 presents the results for underreaction and out-of-sample predictability tests, discussed in Sections 4.2-4.4, for the full sample 
period. The first column denotes the commodity log price changes used for testing, the second column reports the industry return (dependent 
variable), the third column denotes the lag length of the commodity return included in the regression. Columns 4-7, corresponding to Panel 
A, report the estimated coefficient for the commodity return, the Newey-West standard error, the Robust t-statistics, and the coefficient of 
determination, respectively. 
The Robust t-statistic corresponds to tests that reject the null hypothesis of no predictability at 10% or smaller, based on the correction 
method of Rapach and Wohar (2006) and Herrera, et al. (2011) which address data-mining concerns. Using this methodology, absolute 
critical values are 3.482. The lag length reported was determined by regressing the industry return on individual lagged values of the 
commodity returns starting from lag 1 and up to lag 30 and recording the longest individual lagged return that is statistically significant, 
given the adjusted critical values. The reported results are based from regressions of Equation 4.2:  
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t rr εαµ ++= −,,   where rt
i is 
industry i’s returns, µi,j and αi,j are real-valued parameters, rt-jc represent jth-lagged percentage change commodity c’s spot prices, and εti is the 
error term. 
For the out-of-sample part we want to know how much forecast power there is from all lags up to the maximal significant lag length (S). 
Hence, we estimate multivariate regressions of Equation 4.3: , ,
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r r  over a five year rolling window to 
estimate the co-efficient values for the forecast, which are then used to generate the forecasts. Column 8 under Panel B reports the adjusted 
Theil’s U and Column 9 reports the p-value of the Clark-West (2007) test statistic; both these measures adjust for the parameter uncertainty 
associated with estimating the alternative model under the assumption of no predictability. The reported results in Panel B are estimated from 
equation 4.3 where S corresponds to the maximal lag length found to be significant. 
 
 
 
36 
Figure 1: Granger-Causality Tests Length of Delayed Reaction. 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure displays results for the Length of Delayed Reaction in days (Y axis) for the Fama-French industry classifications (X-axis). We display results for the commodity with the 
greatest amount of predictability in each of four commodity categories (energy, grains, industrial metals and precious metals)
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